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Kenisha Garnett and David J. Parsons∗
The precautionary principle was formulated to provide a basis for political action to pro-
tect the environment from potentially severe or irreversible harm in circumstances of scien-
tific uncertainty that prevent a full risk or cost-benefit analysis. It underpins environmental
law in the European Union and has been extended to include public health and consumer
safety. The aim of this study was to examine how the precautionary principle has been in-
terpreted and subsequently applied in practice, whether these applications were consistent,
and whether they followed the guidance from the Commission. A review of the literature
was used to develop a framework for analysis, based on three attributes: severity of potential
harm, standard of evidence (or degree of uncertainty), and nature of the regulatory action.
This was used to examine 15 pieces of legislation or judicial decisions. The decision whether
or not to apply the precautionary principle appears to be poorly defined, with ambiguities in-
herent in determining what level of uncertainty and significance of hazard justifies invoking it.
The cases reviewed suggest that the Commission’s guidance was not followed consistently in
forming legislation, although judicial decisions tended to be more consistent and to follow the
guidance by requiring plausible evidence of potential hazard in order to invoke precaution.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this research was to investigate how
the precautionary principle has been applied in prac-
tice in European Union (EU) legislation and legal
decisions, and, in particular, whether the applications
were mutually consistent and followed the guidance
of the European Commission.(1) It focused on ques-
tions around the nature of the hazard, the standard of
evidence for which it is appropriate, the nature of the
precautionary action, and the provision for gather-
ing further evidence. The remainder of this introduc-
tion summarizes some of the statements of the pre-
cautionary principle in international affairs, leading
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to its formal incorporation into EU law. It also high-
lights some of the attributes often considered when
invoking the precautionary principle that will form
the basis of the theoretical framework used to ana-
lyze the cases.
In a discussion of the tensions between “sci-
entific” evidence-based risk assessments and
precautionary approaches to risk, Lo¨fstedt(2) noted
that “[d]ifferent guidelines and legal cases are being
agreed upon without a clear and coherent policy as
to when the Commission should be using risk assess-
ments, let alone the precautionary principle” and
identified the need for “a thorough academic analysis
of the present use of the precautionary principle”
leading to recommendations to ensure that its future
use will be “evidence-based and risk-informed.”
There have been a few studies on the use of the
precautionary principle, notably some exploring
its application in different jurisdictions. Zander(3)
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compared Sweden, one of the first to adopt the
principle with the United Kingdom, where EUmem-
bership has influenced its adoption, and the United
States, often said to be less precautionary. Vogel(4)
examined the history of regulation in the EU and
the United States, and found, for the issues he con-
sidered, a general trend for the EU to have become
more precautionary and the United States less so,
although there were exceptions in both jurisdictions.
Wiener et al.(5) compared the approaches to regu-
lation of 100 risks in the EU and the United States
and found that both jurisdictions were selective in
the use of the precautionary principle, with neither
consistently more precautionary than the other. An-
other study(6) considered 88 alleged “false positives,”
mainly from the United States and Europe, where
the precautionary principle was applied, but later
found to be unwarranted. It concluded that all but
four were actually “real risks” or cases where “the
jury is still out,” and that “fear of false positives is
misplaced and should not be a rationale for avoiding
precautionary actions where warranted.” In contrast
to these studies, this article focuses on practices
observed in a sample of EU legislation and case law.
The most widely recognized early statement of
the precautionary principle in international environ-
mental policy was Principle 15 of the Declaration of
the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and De-
velopment (the “Rio Declaration”):
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely used by States according to
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious and
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.(7)
The Rio Declaration contains three attributes:
(1) a potential future harm—in this case, “serious
and irreversible damage”; (2) an implicit or explicit
requirement for a real basis for concern—“threat”
not speculation; and (3) action to prevent harm
before scientific certainty has been achieved.
There have been many formulations of the pre-
cautionary principle since the Rio Declaration; in-
deed, Sandin(8) identified 19 different versions. A
prominent example, which extended the applica-
tion of precaution, was the Wingspread Statement,
formulated by a conference of scientists, philoso-
phers, lawyers, and environmental activists.(9) This
extended the scope of the precautionary principle
to “threats of harm to human health or the envi-
ronment” and notably removed the qualifier of the
severity of the harm being considered. It also con-
tained an explicit reversal of the burden of proof onto
the proponent of the activity.
The status of the precautionary principle within
international law is still debated. Although it is
widely cited in international agreements, there is dis-
agreement as to whether it can now be considered
to be part of customary law.(10) Within the EU, how-
ever, it has an explicit place in environmental law, en-
shrined in Article 174(2) (previously Article 130R) of
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992:(11)
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a
high level of protection taking into account the diversity
of situations in the various regions of the Community. It
shall be based on the Precautionary Principle and on the
principles that preventive action should be taken, that
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified
at source and that the polluter should pay.
The precautionary principle is not expressed ex-
plicitly in the Treaty; nevertheless, it is considered an
autonomous principle inspired by the constitutional
traditions in EU member states. It further developed
as a general principle of Community law in the early
2000s, and was formally articulated by the European
Commission’s Communication on the Precautionary
Principle,(1) and endorsed by the Council of Minis-
ters’ Nice Resolution.(12) This version stated that the
precautionary principle is justified
where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or
uncertain and there are indications through preliminary
objective scientific evaluation that there are “reason-
able grounds” for concern that the potentially danger-
ous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant
health may be inconsistent with the chosen level of pro-
tection. (p. 10)
The Commission Communication(1) was in-
tended to give guidance on the nature of precaution-
ary action, and in so doing advised that measures
should be:
 proportional to the chosen level of protection;
 nondiscriminatory in their applications;
 consistent with similar measures already taken;
 based on an examination of the potential bene-
fits and costs of action or lack of action;
 subject to review, in light of new scientific data;
 capable of assigning responsibility for produc-
ing the scientific evidence necessary for a com-
prehensive risk assessment.
The first three points placed the precautionary
principle within the broader EU legal framework.
The fourth point made it clear that decisions on its
application should not be based solely on assessment
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of the potential hazards. The last two points devel-
oped the idea that use of the precautionary principle
is contingent on future data (which could either rein-
force or contradict the need for protection) and that
it is desirable to move toward a full evidence-based
risk assessment. Unlike the Wingspread Statement,
it did not necessarily place the burden of proof on
the proponent.
Both the EU version and the Wingspread State-
ment (and other formulations) contain the same
three attributes found in the Rio Declaration: po-
tential future harm, basis for concern, and anticipa-
tory action before full certainty is achieved. They
differ in the definition of the harms to which it is
applicable and the robustness of evidence, or de-
gree of uncertainty, required as a basis for con-
cern. The Wingspread Statement adds the reversed
burden of proof to the consideration of the evi-
dence, and the Commission Communication includes
more explicit contingency of continued action on
future data. These attributes are explored further
below to form part of the basis of the subsequent
assessment.
The following section is a brief review of some
of the critiques of and academic debates over the
precautionary principle, which develop some of
the attributes described above. Subsequently, the
methodology is described and applied to examine a
sample of EU legislation, Council and Commission
decisions, and Court of Justice of the European
Union (ECJ) judgments to assess how consistent or
otherwise they were in their use of the precautionary
principle.
2. CRITIQUES AND ATTRIBUTES
OF PRECAUTION
Since its initial formulation, and especially as
it has achieved prominence in EU policy, the pre-
cautionary principle has been widely debated in
both academic and informal literature, attracting
strong support and harsh criticism. The literature
is extensive and only a few examples can be in-
cluded here. As a legal principle and a basis for
legislation, its critics have claimed that it is vague
and incoherent(8,13,14, pp. 14–15) and lacks a single ac-
cepted formulation,(8) which risks inconsistency in its
application.(15) It has been suggested that the precau-
tionary principle emphasizes hazard rather than risk,
so tends to focus on worst cases,(14) rather than ratio-
nal analysis of risks and benefits.(16) It is argued that,
by concentrating on unknown risks and ignoring ben-
efits, it distorts priorities or prevents beneficial devel-
opments, with potentially harmful consequences,(17)
and stifles innovation.(13,18) Proponents counter that
the disbenefits are hypothetical,(19) that the protec-
tion of the environment and human health is an over-
riding priority, and that the costs of the consequences
of a lack of precaution may also be large.(20) They
also point to research that suggests that the applica-
tion of regulation may stimulate innovation in tech-
nology, products, and processes.(20,21)
The precautionary principle has also been de-
fended, especially for extreme risks (i.e., those with
extremely severe consequences), as providing “an
ethical, normative principle for dealing with an un-
certain future, where, given the complexity and in-
terconnectedness of the natural and social systems
in which we live, catastrophic black swans are more
likely to occur.”(22) It has also been argued that
“objective risk” does not exist independently of the
preferences, beliefs, and moral choices of people
and society.(23) In a democracy, this implies that
public opinion about risk is a legitimate considera-
tion for the formulation of policy. Gee(24) also ar-
gues for wider use of the precautionary principle,
both as a basis for timely actions and to trigger a
broader debate about “technical pathways to the fu-
ture.” However, he adds that there is a need for
sound scientific and stakeholder processes, consider-
ing both risks and benefits, and using a clearer def-
inition of the principle than many of the standard
versions.
In response to this lack of consensus, several
authors have attempted to clarify the philosophical
basis for the precautionary principle and develop
a more formal understanding of when it should
be applied, especially the degree of “epistemic”
uncertainty that justifies precaution.(25–27) They thus
address the second of the attributes identified in the
introduction: the basis for concern, and the tension
between evidence and uncertainty. O’Riordan and
Cameron(28) suggest that the most common under-
standing of the precautionary principle is to act
“prudently” when there is “sufficient” evidence and
where action may be justified on “reasonable judg-
ments” of costeffectiveness and where inaction could
lead to potential irreversible or demonstrable hard-
ship to the defenders and future generations. There
is an implication that grounds more substantial than
mere speculation are required for the precautionary
principle to be invoked. All formulations of the
precautionary principle are based on anticipatory
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action before “full scientific certainty” (or similar
state) is reached; it seems to be understood, certainly
in the Commission Communication,(1) that there is
a point at which evidence is sufficient to apply the
tools of risk assessment.
The need for a minimal evidentiary base be-
fore invoking the precautionary principle has been
emphasized by other authors. A review of risk as-
sessment in EU food and safety law(29) concluded
that precautionary measures should not be based
on “purely hypothetical or academic considerations”
founded on “mere superstitions, which are not yet
scientifically verified.” Rather, it is closely connected
to risk assessment and should be preceded by a
comprehensive evaluation of possible risk to human
health and the environment, based on the most re-
cent scientific information. Belve`ze(30) also placed
the precautionary principle as an integral part of
a risk assessment framework. Crawford-Brown and
Crawford-Brown(31) expanded on this, suggesting
that it is untenable to make claims about risks un-
til evidence accumulates to a minimal level, referred
to as an “epistemic threshold.” The requirement for
a minimum standard of evidence is embodied in the
Commission Communication,(1) but it has been ar-
gued that it has not been applied consistently by the
courts.(32)
There is thus a range of uncertainty, between the
lower bound of evidence required before the precau-
tionary principle should be considered and the upper
bound where the evidence reduces the uncertainty to
the level where risk assessment is feasible and appro-
priate. Unfortunately, the positions of these bounds
are unclear, and subject to variations in interpreta-
tion in practice.
Once the precautionary principle has been in-
voked, the important considerations relate to the
third attribute: the nature of precautionary action
and the provision for review in the light of further
evidence. In general, actions with varying levels of
stringency are possible, depending on the severity
of the harm being avoided, the strength of the evi-
dence, and the attitude to precaution. The Commis-
sion Communication(1) established a requirement to
review measures after their introduction in the light
of new scientific evidence, and it implied that it is
desirable to collect evidence for a full risk assess-
ment, for which responsibility might be assigned to
any party, including the regulator, in contrast to the
Wingspread Statement. In general, it has been noted
that the lower epistemic threshold to establish a
threat of harm does not bear the same stringent con-
ditions of scientific proof used in risk assessment,(33)
thus increasing the burden that is transferred to the
proponent of the potential “risky” activity to prove
that it is safe.
The three attributes discussed above formed the
basis for the assessment in this study: severity of po-
tential harm, degree of epistemic uncertainty (con-
versely quality of evidence), and the precautionary
measures taken, including the provision for review.
These present various defining attributes of the pre-
cautionary principle, where differences in interpreta-
tion mean that precautionary actions tend to be in-
voked differently, as what triggers implementation is
often unclear.
Some authors have made distinctions between
a “weak” and “strong” application of the precau-
tionary principle, which have fueled debates over
how stringent government regulation should be,
what margin of safety should be built into it, and
what conditions often prompt precautionary action
(Table I).(3,31,34–36) Weak application of the pre-
cautionary principle is characterized by a relatively
high epistemic threshold and a preference for risk
management. Uncertainty about the consequences
of an activity may justify regulation, if there are
plausible grounds for believing that it may be
harmful. There may be an emphasis on gathering
evidence about the chance and severity of harm.
Strong application tends to have a lower epistemic
threshold and tends toward risk prevention. Un-
certainty about an activity may in itself be seen as
necessitating stringent actions, such as prohibition,
even if there are only weak grounds for believing
that it may be harmful. The burden of proof is
often reversed, so that the proponent is required to
provide proof of a high level of safety. Moderate
application assumes that uncertainty justifies action,
providing that it can be established that a sufficiently
serious threat exists. Controls that include building
in larger safety margins and setting up emergency
plans may be justified, and extensive investigation
into the cause–effect relationship is pursued to
reduce uncertainty, possibly to relax the controls
if the activity is later proven safe.(3,31,35,36) Clearly,
reducing several factors to a single dimension risks
oversimplification, but the weak–strong spectrum
may be useful, if used carefully. In these terms,
the Wingspread Statement represents a stronger
approach to precaution than the Rio Declaration(7)
and the Commission Communication.(1)
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Table I. Interpreting the Strength of Application of the Precautionary Principle
Attributes used to Weak precaution: Moderate Strong precaution:
assess the strength of “uncertainty precaution: “uncertainty justifies
application of the does not “uncertainty shifting the burden
the precautionary justify justifies and standard
principle inaction” action” of proof”
Severity of potential harm
prompting precautionary
action as referenced in
international legislation
and regulation
Rio Declaration suggests that
regulation is permitted to
avoid “serious and
irreversible damage”
The Commission Communication on
the precautionary principle
suggests the use of regulation
proportional to the risk level,
following preliminary objective
scientific evaluation to avoid
“potentially dangerous effects”
The Wingspread Statement
conveys that clear responsibility
lies with the proponent in
proving an activity is safe even
if the cause and effect
relationship cannot be
determined scientifically to
avoid “threats of harm”
Degree of epistemic
uncertainty/quality of
evidence prompting
precautionary action
Regulation is permitted in the
absence of full scientific
certainty; significant
precautionary action may be
invoked under uncertainty
Research is needed to establish cause
and effect (reduce uncertainty)
upon which regulatory decisions
are based; until then, precautionary
action includes setting regulatory
standards with large margins of
safety built in through application
of uncertainty factors
Uncertainty necessitates
forbidding the potentially risky
activity until the proponent of
the activity demonstrates that it
poses no (or acceptable) risk;
and is sufficiently safe
Nature of precautionary
action/measures taken
and provision for review
Presumption of risk
management; banning very
rare
Underlying presumption of risk
management; banning possible, but
is a last resort; measures are
provisional or subject to review
when new information or scientific
evidence emerges
Presumption of risk avoidance;
banning is likely
Sources: Crawford-Brown and Crawford-Brown(31), Zander(3), Sachs(34), Lo¨fstedt(35), and UK-ILGRA(36)
3. METHODOLOGY: CASE STUDY
APPROACH
A key objective of the research was to examine
how the precautionary principle has been applied
in practice in EU legislation and legal decisions.
As a basis for this, there was an exploration of the
practice-guiding interpretations of the precautionary
principle, which reflect an explicit or implicit basis
for taking precautionary action. The aim was to
understand and explain differences in precautionary
thinking, reflecting on the particular context of the
decision (i.e., subject, degree of harm, availability of
evidence, and action taken) in order to identify how
the Commission and the European courts have inter-
preted, and subsequently applied, the precautionary
principle in practice, whether these applications were
consistent, and whether they followed the guidance
from the Commission.(1)
A multiple case study approach based on a “the-
oretical replication” design was adopted to examine
how the precautionary principle has been used in the
regulation of environmental, health, and consumer
safety issues (Fig. 1). A review of several case studies
addressed questions around how the precautionary
principle has been interpreted, articulated, and sub-
sequently applied through European legislation and
regulation, and how its meaning has been developed
and clarified through case law.
There were four main steps in the research: (1)
design of the study and development of a theoretical
framework on which to base subsequent case analy-
sis, (2) a search of the EUR-Lex database (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/) to identify relevant cases for study,
(3) selection of cases from the search results, apply-
ing a “theoretical” sampling technique, and (4) anal-
yses of cases.
3.1. Study Design and Theoretical Framework
Multiple case studies were used to explore the
contextual conditions around decisions to invoke the
precautionary principle and, in some disputed cases,
decisions taken to revoke its use. The multiple case
study approach is an empirical form of inquiry ap-
propriate for qualitative studies,(37) where the goal
for this study was to describe the characteristics of
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individual and cross-
case comparisons 
1: Theoretical framework and design 
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frame: 
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application of the 
PP.  
 
2) Case-speciic
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Comparison of 
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Context  
 Case  
Context  
Case  
Context  
  Case  
Fig. 1. Multiple case study design (based on Yin(37)).
the cases (i.e., how the precautionary principle is in-
terpreted and subsequently applied) and the context
surrounding each case (i.e., circumstances and judg-
ments underpinning decisions to invoke or revoke
the precautionary principle).
A theoretical framework was developed from
the review of the academic literature around the pre-
cautionary principle (Table II). Questions and ana-
lytical factors were defined and subsequently used to
review each case systematically in order to gather ev-
idence around the three attributes discussed above.
The cases were then assessed to determine the extent
to which precautionary thinking and actions were
replicated in different situations. This allowed for an
exploration of differences in practice, and positioning
of the cases along a continuum from weak to strong
application of the precautionary principle.
3.2. Search Procedures and Results
To find the set of relevant legislation, the
EUR-Lex database was searched for documents
in “Domain = Legislation” containing the phrase
“precautionary principle.” Separate searches were
carried out for directives, regulations, and regulatory
decisions. The searches of EU legislation found 40
directives, 32 regulations, and 41 decisions that ex-
plicitly used the search phrase. Of these, seven direc-
tives and 17 regulations included the phrase outside
the recitals (introductory text). Health, environment,
and food were the most frequent topics, with fewer
pieces of legislation related to consumer protection.
A similar procedure was followed to find cases in
the ECJ that referred to the precautionary principle.
The search of court cases included both the judg-
ments of the court and the opinions of the Advocates
General, which often gave more detailed informa-
tion on the interpretation. There were 109 judgments
containing the phrase “precautionary principle,”
but the selection was restricted to 35 cases between
member states and the EU to explore the contrasts
between national and EU views. Although the full set
covered the same range of topics as the legislation,
the majority of informative judgments were found in
the areas of public health and consumer protection.
3.3. Sampling Procedure
Replication designs are common in multiple case
studies that aim to understand how a concept or the-
ory manifests across several cases. When selecting
cases, these designs typically use “theoretical” or sys-
tematic sampling based on a judgment logic, rather
than random or stratified sampling, as the aim is to
observe the state of development of a phenomenon
and not to measure its incidence or prevalence in
the cases.(37) With theoretical sampling, “cases are
selected because they are particularly suitable for
illuminating and extending relationships and logic
among constructs.”(38)
During case selection, emphasis was placed on
deriving a sample that covered the broad spectrum of
issues within EU legislation, including directives and
regulations, judicial cases, and regulatory disputes
addressing environment, health, and consumer safety
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Table II. Theoretical Framework for Reviewing the Case Studies
Context for Analysis Questions for Interrogating the Data Theoretical Construct
Trend of principle application in
the EU (sectoral application or
How and when did the precautionary
principle come into play?
Strength of application:
general Community law) How is it applied?
How is its use justified?
What was the outcome for regulation
based on the precautionary principle?
Has this been upheld, overturned, or
superseded?
Indicators that characterize the
interpretation, and subsequent
application of, the
precautionary principle in
practice in the EU
Trend of application of the precautionary
principle (weak–strong spectrum), based on:
(1) Severity of potential harm
(2) Standards of evidence and degree of
uncertainty
(3) Nature of precautionary action and
provision for review
issues. An important consideration in this study was
the context in each case that offered rival expla-
nations of how parties understood and applied the
precautionary principle. When selecting court cases,
representative cases were chosen from some of
the common topics, excluding topics in the sam-
ple of Council and Commission decisions. As a re-
sult, none of the selected cases was purely envi-
ronmental, though some covered both environmen-
tal and health concerns (e.g., genetically modified
organisms—GMOs). The selection took account of
the number of references to the precautionary princi-
ple (the “relevance” order in the search) and whether
it was important to the case or mentioned in pass-
ing. Some of the secondary sources (e.g., Marchant
andMossman(15)) had identified judgments that were
particularly pertinent, which were considered for re-
view, but used with caution, because of potential se-
lection biases.
Fifteen case studies were selected for analysis:
four directives, four regulations, three regulatory de-
cisions by the Council or Commission, and four ECJ
cases between states and the Commission.
3.4. Review and Assessment of Cases
The selected cases were examined to assess what
reference was made to the precautionary principle
and the extent to which they allowed for an examina-
tion of conditions for invoking (or revoking) the pre-
cautionary principle. Some were explicit in their ap-
plication of the precautionary principle, while there
was some question around whether other cases ac-
tually reflected the precautionary principle or were
based on preventative action or well-founded science
as part of a more risk-based approach. In each case,
an analysis was made of the nature of the hazard and
inherent uncertainties, and the standard of evidence
that was deemed appropriate for application of the
precautionary principle.
Assessing the strength of application of the
precautionary principle relied on the attributes
derived from the academic literature and from
the Commission Communication:(1) the severity of
possible harm, standards of evidence and degree of
uncertainty, including the burden of proof, and the
type of action taken, including provision for review
(Table I). The review of each case sought to gather
evidence around these three attributes to reveal
what indicators characterized the interpretation and
subsequent application of the precautionary princi-
ple, and the strength of application of the principle
implied in each case. Evidence found in some of the
cases was used to support an argument (or general
findings), while the evidence from all other cases
was summarized in supplementary tables to ensure
traceability of the data and greater transparency of
the process.
Conclusions drawn from the case studies were
compared to understand the reasons for differences
or similarities across the cases, reflecting on the
strength of application of the precautionary principle
and the trends observed. These cross-case conclu-
sions offer insight into the conditions for invoking or
revoking the precautionary principle, and provided
a basis for illuminating, extending, or revealing con-
trasting arguments in the literature around the use
of the precautionary principle in practice in the EU.
4. FINDINGS: STRENGTH OF APPLICATION
OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
In most of the cases reviewed, the precautionary
principle was taken as a general duty to act under
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uncertainty to avoid serious or irreversible risks. The
application of the precautionary principle usually
concerned a hazard in the form of a current or
proposed activity that might be harmful. However,
there was usually sufficient uncertainty about the
exposure pathway, and hence the risk, or the severity
of the harm to prevent a reliable risk assessment. The
discussion that follows highlights the ambiguities
inherent in determining what level of uncertainty
and significance of hazard justifies invoking the
precautionary principle.
4.1. EU Directives and Regulations
The directives and regulations reviewed showed
that the precautionary principle in EU law was ap-
plied differently with very little consistency across
cases regarding the conditions for taking precau-
tionary action and the basis for imposing regulation
(Table III).
Three applications were assessed to be strong
with a relatively low standard of proof and no clear
indication of the basis for invoking the precaution-
ary principle. For example, Directive 2001/18(39) es-
tablishes a prior approval mechanism for the deliber-
ate release of GMOs into the environment, where all
member states are consulted and consensus gained
before a GMO and its products are allowed on the
Community market: “No GMOs, as or in products,
intended for deliberate release are to be considered
for placing on the market without first having been
subjected to satisfactory field testing . . . .” The Di-
rective stipulates the potential risks posed to human
health and the environment should be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. Where a GMO and its products
are released to the market, subsequent monitoring of
its impact (including cumulative effects) must be as-
sessed to ensure it remains safe. This provides a basis
for challenging the release of GMOs, should moni-
toring reveal a future threat to human health or the
environment.
The emphasis on field testing places a heavy
burden of proof on the proponent of a GMO to
show that it is safe. The requirement for a consensus
among all member states, whether or not the GMO
will be used in their territory, further raises the stan-
dard for “proof of safety,” which is consistent with
a strong interpretation of the precautionary princi-
ple. The resulting action is equally strict: prohibition,
rather than restriction to maintain a high level of pro-
tection, as observed in other cases reviewed (Table
III). While it is implicitly understood that the burden
of proof is transferred to the proponent to demon-
strate a product or activity is “safe,” there is no guid-
ance provided on level of proof or margin of safety
required to establish this.
Three applications were assessed to be mod-
erate, since products were provisionally restricted
based on scientific evidence of potential harm, but
subject to review once new information about the
risks emerged. For example, Directive 2011/65(40) re-
stricts the use of certain hazardous substances in elec-
trical and electronic equipment (EEE) and specifies
precautionary measures to avoid risks:
As soon as scientific evidence is available, and tak-
ing into account the precautionary principle, the
restriction of other hazardous substances, includ-
ing . . . [nanomaterials], which may be hazardous due to
properties relating to their size or structure, and their
substitution by more environmentally friendly alterna-
tives, which ensure the same level of protection of con-
sumers, should be examined.
. . . a review, based on a thorough assessment, and
amendment of the list of restricted substances . . . shall
be considered . . . and periodically thereafter on its own
initiative or following the submission of a proposal by a
Member State . . .
Provisions in the Directive put emphasis on
the development of safer substances, and it places
the burden of environmental protection on the
producers of equipment, which may also help to
stimulate innovation. However, broad restrictions
on substances (e.g., nanomaterials) have come
under criticism, with industry claiming that health
and environmental concerns are prioritized over
innovation in the performance and functionality of
EEE.(41) Industry bodies support a more risk-based
approach, where restrictions are only made after a
full scientific analysis.(42)
Some of the pieces of EU legislation reviewed
make provisions to review precautionary measures
once new scientific evidence and information is re-
vealed. However, there are nuances in the language
used that implicitly suggest what basis justifies a
review, and subsequent modification, of measures.
Directive 2011/65/EU(40) suggests measures be re-
viewed “based on thorough assessment, and amend-
ment of the list of restricted substances.” Regulation
(EC) No 178/2002, laying down the basis for food
law,(43) suggests measures “be reviewed within a rea-
sonable period of time, depending on the nature of
the risk to life and health.” Other legislation is more
explicit about the provisional nature of action under
the precautionary principle and the need for review:
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Table III. Strength of Application of the Precautionary Principle: Examples of EU Law
Subject(s) Severity Evidence for Nature Strength
of of Potential Threat: Standard of of
Case Protection Harm of Proof Regulation Application
Directive
2001/18/EC
(GMOs)
Environment/
human health
Severe Relatively low Products to be proved safe
through field testing at R&D
stage in potentially affected
ecosystems
Strong
Directive
2009/127/EC
(Pesticide
machinery)
Human health/
environment/
consumer
safety
Severe Relatively low Product bans imposed where
available scientific evidence is
insufficient for accurate risk
assessment
Strong
Regulation (EC)
No. 1946/2003
(GMOs)
Environment/
human health
Severe Relatively low Duty to prevent significant
adverse effect on the
conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity,
taking into account risk to
human health
Strong
Directive
2011/65/EU
(Restriction of
hazardous
substances)
Human health/
environment
Severe-to-
moderate
Moderate/high Substances “provisionally”
restricted, subject to review of
new evidence; technical and
economic feasibility of options
considered, including
alternatives
Moderate
Regulation (EC)
No. 178/2002
(Food safety)
Human health/
consumer
safety
Severe-to-
moderate
Moderate/high Products “provisionally”
restricted, subject to review of
new evidence though depends
on severity of risk; technical and
economic feasibility and impact
on trade also considered
Moderate
Council
Regulation
(EC) No.
708/2007
(Alien aquatic
species)
Environment Severe-to-
moderate
Moderate/high Restrictions imposed on basis of
scientific evidence, though
review is possible where new
evidence materializes
Moderate
Directive
2013/30/EU
(Offshore
safety)
Environment Severe High Avoidance of major accidents,
damage rectified at source,
considering effectiveness, costs,
and benefits of action
Weak
Regulation (EC)
No. 1334/2008
(Use of
flavorings)
Human health/
consumer
safety
Severe High Restrictions imposed with firm
scientific evidence of potential
harm to consumers; social,
economic, ethical, and other
factors considered
Weak
. . . in cases where the relevant scientific evidence is in-
sufficient, the precautionary principle allows the Com-
munity to provisionally adopt measures on the basis of
available pertinent information, pending an additional
assessment of risk and a review of the measure within a
reasonable period of time.(44)
The emphasis placed on setting “provisional”
measures implies that any restriction placed on
trading food responds to a probable and serious
potential health impact, but action is temporary until
such a time that sufficient evidence is gathered about
the potential risk. The burden of proof is transferred
to the proponent, though there is no guidance in
the cases reviewed (Table III) on the nature of
information that would justify a reexamination of
the potential risk.
Two applications of the precautionary principle
were assessed to be weak, each with a high standard
of proof set out for invoking the principle, where firm
scientific evidence, a weighting of costs and benefits,
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and some consideration of the effectiveness of mea-
sures play a role in approving regulation. For exam-
ple, in Directive 2013/30(45) on offshore safety regula-
tions: “[Operators are expected to] reduce the risk of
a major accident as low as reasonably practical, to the
point where the cost of further risk reduction would
be grossly disproportionate to the benefits of such
reduction.” An assessment of the “appropriateness”
of action through consideration of the effectiveness,
costs, and benefits of measures to achieve the desired
level of precaution is implicit within the directive.
Where similar standards are imposed for health
and consumer legislation (e.g., Regulation No.
1334/2008 on use of flavorings(46)), a wider range
of issues, including societal, economic, ethical, and
environmental factors, is considered in approving
regulation. In these cases, firm scientific evidence of
potential harm to the consumer is needed to jus-
tify precautionary action and may serve to protect
against the use of product bans that impede free
movement of goods within the Community market:
“[Flavorings] must be safe when used, and certain
[types] should, therefore, undergo a risk assessment
[where possible, determining any negative conse-
quences for vulnerable groups] before they can be
permitted in food.”
In the cases reviewed (Table III), there appear
to be differences around the burden of proof. A re-
quirement to justify that a product is safe (stronger
applications; e.g., Directive 2001/18/EC on the de-
liberate release of GMOs) carries with it a higher
reversed burden of proof, while proving a product
may potentially cause harm (weaker applications;
e.g., Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2008 on use of food
flavorings) necessitates demonstrating some plausi-
ble cause and effect relationship. The fear is that a
higher reversed burden of proof may require propo-
nents to establish safety beyond “reasonable levels,”
which may have cost implications.
4.2. Regulatory Decisions and Court Judgments
The review of regulatory decisions and court
judgments showed a more consistent approach to
considering what conditions warrant recourse to the
precautionary principle and the way in which it was
applied. Five cases were assessed to be weak appli-
cations, one weak-to-moderate, and one moderate-
to-strong (Table IV). This consistency came in part
from the practice of drawing precedents from previ-
ous case law when reaching decisions.
A weak application of the precautionary prin-
ciple was evident in the court’s decision in most
judicial cases reviewed. In most instances, a high
standard for scientific proof was established for
invoking the principle with a broad spectrum of
precautionary action proposed with regard to food
safety and public health. A key point in these cases
was the minimum standard of evidence required to
apply the precautionary principle and, to a lesser
extent, the standard at which risk assessment became
more appropriate. In most disputed cases, the court
required a high standard of proof for invoking the
precautionary principle by setting out requirements
for firm scientific evidence, a weighting of costs and
benefits, and some consideration of the effectiveness
of the measures as a basis for approving regulation:
A proper application of the precautionary principle re-
quires, in the first place, the identification of the poten-
tially negative consequences for health of the proposed
addition of nutrients, and, secondly, a comprehensive
assessment of the risk for health based on the most reli-
able scientific data available and the most recent results
of international research.(47)
The introduction of new national provisions must be
based on new scientific evidence relating to the protec-
tion of the environment or working environment . . . .(48)
Further research [is needed] on the likelihood of the
emergence of susceptibility to antimicrobial substances,
and the possibility of their resistance to therapeutic an-
tibiotics and other antimicrobial agents.(49)
A presumption of risk management is inherent
in these statements, which was the underlying basis
for refuting the interpretation by the Kingdom of
Netherlands authorities of provisions that presumed
a strong application of the precautionary principle:
“prohibiting the addition of nutrients, vitamins
and minerals to foods, unless there is a nutritional
need for these substances in the population.” The
Commission challenged the interpretation of the
precautionary principle in this case, and in reference
to precedent set in a similar judgment,(50) suggested
that a high standard of proof was needed to impose
restrictions on the sale of the vitamin-fortified
products, which must be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.(47) The Commission suggested that such
restrictions constituted unjustified obstacles to
intra-Community trade and required credible evi-
dence of the threat of serious harm before imposing
such a ban. The court ruled against the Netherlands
government, thus establishing further precedent for
use of high standards of proof, as observed in other
cases reviewed (Table IV).
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Table IV. Strength of Application of the Precautionary Principle: Examples of EU Regulatory Decisions and Court Judgments
Severity Conditions for Nature
Subject(s) of Precautionary of Strength
of Potential Action: Standard Regulatory of
Case Protection Harm of Proof Action Application
United Kingdom
v. Commission:
C-180/96 (BSE)
Human health Severe Relatively low-
to-moderate
Product ban upheld; hazard
considered “sufficiently
severe,” despite
uncertainty about the
causal link
Moderate-to-
strong
Commission
Decision
1999/832/EC
(Netherlands,
creosote)
Environment/
human health
Severe-to-
moderate
High Product ban upheld;
“credible evidence” of a
threat of harm, where
local circumstances
warrant precautionary
action
Weak-to-
moderate
Commission
Decision
2003/653/EC
(Austria,
GMOs)
Environment/
human health
Moderate-to-
low
High Product ban rejected;
insufficient evidence
around a “local or
geographic-specific” risk
of potentially
“dangerous effects”
Weak
Council Decision
2009/121/EC
(antimicrobials)
Human health/
environment
Low High Product ban rejected; lack
of sufficient evidence
around “likelihood of
occurrence and severity
of consequences”
Weak
Commission v.
Denmark:
C-192/01 (fruit
juice)
Human health Low High Product ban rejected;
insufficient scientific data
to substantiate “real”
threat to public health
Weak
Germany v.
Commission:
C-512/99
(mineral wool)
Human health/
consumer
safety
Low High Reclassification of
carcinogenic potential of
product rejected; lack of
a definitive scientific
position on potential for
harm
Weak
Commission v.
Kingdom of the
Netherlands
C-41/02
(breakfast
cereal)
Human health Low High Product ban rejected;
insufficient scientific data
to substantiate “real”
threat to public health
Weak
Conversely, a moderate-to-strong application of
the principle was evident where there was deemed to
be a risk of severe consequences for public health.
For instance, the Commission imposed stringent pre-
cautionary measures in the form of product restric-
tions on U.K. trade, banning the movement of an-
imals, meat, and derived products possibly exposed
to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE):
Although there is no direct evidence of a link, on cur-
rent data and in absence of any credible alternative the
most likely explanation at present is that these cases are
linked to exposure to BSE before the introduction of
the [specified bovine offal] ban in 1989. This is a cause
for great concern.(51)
Despite the lack of definitive evidence, the
potential impact on human health necessitated
enforcing “a high level of protection of human life
and health.” The effect on trade and U.K. agriculture
were deemed relatively unimportant compared with
preventing the spread of the disease, the protection
of public health, and the maintenance of public
confidence in European beef. Recourse to the pre-
cautionary principle was presumably justified on the
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basis that the associated consequences were too se-
vere to allow even the slightest chance of occurrence.
A weak-to-moderate application of the precau-
tionary principle was deemed more appropriate in
less extreme cases (those unrelated to human mor-
tality). In such cases, a serious human health hazard
may still be enough to invoke strong precautionary
measures, but these provisions are not usually based
solely on conjecture or a hypothetical causal link. For
example, a relatively low standard of proof was ap-
parent in the Commission Decision 1999/832/EC(52)
(Table IV) in which the Commission approved a pro-
posal by the Netherlands government to establish
more restrictive regulations on the use of creosote.
However, the Netherlands proposal was based on
new scientific evidence relating to the possibility of
an environment and health risk heightened by the
local circumstances. The Commission approved the
national provisions because a potential health risk
was substantiated by credible evidence of harm in the
prevailing conditions in the member state. This con-
veyed a strong message that the risk claim must be
substantiated in order to justify stricter national pro-
visions.
5. CONCLUSION
The decision whether or not to apply the precau-
tionary principle appears to be poorly defined, with
ambiguities inherent in determining what level of un-
certainty and significance of hazard justifies invoking
the precautionary principle.
The sample of cases reviewed in this study sug-
gests that the Commission’s guidance for invoking
the precautionary principle was not followed consis-
tently in forming legislation, although ECJ decisions
tended to resist this trend by requiring plausible evi-
dence of potential hazard in order to invoke precau-
tion. These findings support those of Lo¨fsted(32) for
legislation, while differing for court cases, probably
due to a different selection of cases for consideration.
Exploring trends in the application of the precaution-
ary principle across a weak–strong spectrum revealed
that weaker applications demand firmer evidence of
harm, and economic considerations may encourage
measures that include regulating with minimal con-
trols. On the other hand, stronger applications re-
quire proponents to bear the burden of proving an
activity is safe, even if a cause–effect relationship
cannot be determined scientifically, to avoid “threats
of harm.” In stronger applications, the tendency is
to pass the cost of implementation to proponents of
the potentially harmful activity or product (United
Kingdom v. Commission(39)).
While some formulations of the precautionary
principle shift the burden of proof toward the pro-
ponent of the potentially harmful activity, the ECJ
and regulatory decisions have often placed the initial
burden on the opponent to provide credible grounds.
However, once invoked, the burden of proof usually
falls on the proponent.
The different standards of proof for invoking
the precautionary principle, established in EU
directives and regulations, suggest that grounds
for invoking the precautionary principle may be
dependent on what is at stake. Extension of the
application of the precautionary principle from
prevention of environmental damage to protection
of human health and consumer safety has changed
the nature of the hazards considered and the types
of evidence available. The cases reviewed revealed
a trend toward requiring less evidence of harm
where there was a severe threat to human health.
Some member states appeared to accept a lower
standard of proof than the ECJ would accept. In
cases where possible consequences of an activity
were sufficiently severe (human mortality in United
Kingdom v. Commission(39)), it was entirely feasible
that the standard of proof would be lowered from an
“absence of full scientific certainty”(7) to “reasonable
grounds for concern,”(1) and that precautionary
measures would include preventive action.
Commentators on the precautionary principle
suggest that the vagueness of its definition is evident
in the lack of guidance on the level of precaution to
adopt in practice.(3,14,19,53) Precautionary measures
tend to vary from those prohibiting an activity to
others that place an obligation on a manufacturer
or operator to find methods to deliver a high level
of protection. In some European legislation, the
language used implies a default to preventative mea-
sures in the absence of full scientific certainty, which
often requires an operator or manufacturer to prove
an activity is safe (e.g., Directive 2001/18(39)). While
this may have the effect of stimulating innovation,(20)
broad restrictions (e.g., early attempts to ban the use
of nanomaterials) have been criticized on the basis
that they could impede progress.
Judgments on proposed precautionary measures
often include economic and legal factors, but rarely
the full consideration of costs and benefits recom-
mended by the Commission Communication.(1)
Recourse to the precautionary principle and the
application of safeguard measures is based around
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varying degrees of scientific uncertainty about the
potential impact on human health. In some cases,
strict measures are proposed to eliminate or control
potential hazards where there are gaps in scientific
theory and a general inability to bridge informa-
tion gaps, for example, in a dose–response model
(e.g., Commission v. Kingdom of Netherlands(47))
and unknown effects of cumulative, multiple, or
interactive exposure. Such cases frequently raised
concerns about potential economic and commercial
consequences, particularly where they affect the pro-
duction or sale of specific commodities. A common
consideration is the impact of national measures on
the internal free market: precaution is not allowed
to override other basic principles of the EU (e.g.,
Regulation No. 1334/2008(46)). Where the potential
consequences were sufficiently severe, in the case of
the ban on exports of British beef during the BSE
crisis, economic considerations were overruled.
The Commission Communication(1) states that
measures based on the precautionary principle
should be periodically reviewed, and amended as
necessary, in light of new scientific information.
Furthermore, it says that it should be “capable of
assigning responsibility for producing the scientific
evidence necessary for a comprehensive risk assess-
ment.” However, if the scientific information remains
incomplete or inconclusive, and the potential hazard
is significant in view of the chosen level of protection,
then the measures should be upheld. Some legisla-
tion (e.g., Directive 2011/65/EU(40)) expresses the
provisional nature of precautionary measures arising
from the precautionary principle and lays down a
requirement for review in the light of new evidence,
or a requirement to develop evidence. Although it
is not made explicit in all the legislation, it appears
that there is an understanding that measures based
on the precautionary principle can, and often should,
be reviewed when new evidence is available. This al-
lows for assessing whether precautionary action has
produced the intended consequences, and checking
whether measures put in place need to be modified,
taking into account new information or knowledge
that may reduce the degree of scientific uncertainty.
In the cases reviewed, however, there was no guid-
ance on what conditions justify a reexamination of
the potential risk, and who would be responsible for
producing the evidence required for risk assessment.
As other authors have pointed out, although the
Commission Communication on the precautionary
principle(1) provided a framework for its application,
the cases reviewed in this study suggest that this is not
consistently followed by the institutions of the EU or
the member states.
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